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WATER MARKETS AN ALTERNATIVE FOR CENTRAL 
WATER ALLOCATION? 
 




South Africa is entering a whole new era in water management. In the face of efforts to 
curtail runaway government spending and protect the environment, water institutions must 
foster the conservation and efficient allocation of existing supplies. They must also take 
water's growing recreational and environmental value into account. The crucial question is, 
can the current water institutions meet today's requirements? Despite the resulting 
inefficiency and waste, traditional resource economists continue to identify taxes, 
regulations, subsidies, and governmental allocation as solutions to today's water problems. 
Internationally, there is enough evidence to prove that central allocation with almost any 
resource gave rise to gross inefficiency. The main reason is the distortions on the value placed 
on resources within such a centralised planning environment. Resources are either valued to 
high or to low. What is the value of freshwater and how can water be allocated in such a way 
as to reflect the scarcity value of water? A non-linear spatial equilibrium model was 
developed to simulate the impact of a potential water market in the Upper-Berg River: 
Western Cape. This paper explores water markets as an alternative to central water allocation 
decisions 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In spite of the vital life-support service which water renders to the planet, 
historically water was seldom considered to have economic value. Water was 
believed to be in abundance, which were available to supply the socio-
economic demands of the time. This situation caused water to be a non-
tradable commodity and therefore a free good. However, the continued 
growth in demand for water from all user sectors has changed this believes 
considerably. Today water is considered as an economic good and a valuable 
asset. In 1992 this principle was adapted at the Water and Environment 
Conference in Dublin. Although still not well understood or well defined, the 
concept was already manifested in many regions of the world in the form of 
privatisation of water supplies, the emergence of water markets, and the 
proliferation of bottled drinking water. This marked the end of the era of 
water as a free good. Many current problems in water allocation policy are 
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due to a failure to recognise the connection between institutional settings, 
states of technology and the hydrology of water systems. These problems will 
o n l y  g r o w  m o r e  i n  f u t u r e  u n t i l  these connections are specifically 
acknowledged and addressed in water policy decisions (Whittlesey & 
Huffaker, 1995). 
 
The new South African Water Act provides the framework for water markets 
in South Africa. For the first time in South African history water legislation 
makes provision for water trading as an option for water allocation. However, 
preferences are still given to administrative price setting for water resources. 
Whilst the National Water Act mentions water markets as a possible 
alternative to allocate water it is very unclear with regard to the legal transfer 
of water use licences. This creates uncertainty. Furthermore, the extent of 
bureaucratic control and regulation of water trading in the new water 
legislation creates highly restrictive conditions for voluntary transfers 
between willing buyers and sellers (Armitage, 1999). Even if water markets 
are introduced the above factors will increase transaction costs and will 
undermine the working of an effective water market. It should be clear from 
the above that the water allocation debate in South Africa is far from over.  
 
This paper attempts to contribute to the debate by investigating the possible 
impact of a water market. A non-linear spatial equilibrium model is used to 
quantify the value of water for different water users and to explore guidelines 
for the working of a water market in the Upper-Berg River in the Western 
Cape. The Upper-Berg River is one of the rivers in South Africa where almost 
all possible problems which might be associated with a water market exists 
and is therefore an excellent area to use as a case study. 
 
2.  BASIC DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL 
 
The model specifications coincide largely with those made by Takayama and 
Judge (1971), Batterham and MacAulay (1994), and Eigenraam (1996). For the 
sake of brevity the full model is not included in the text, a complete 
description of the model can however be obtained from the authors. Trade 
occurs in the model where excess supply (ES) equates excess demand (ED). 
The maximum volume of a commodity that can be supplied by a system if the 
commodity price was not a limiting factor is limited by the fixed resource 
restrictions.  The excess supply is the difference between this maximum and 
the volume being produced at the present price. The excess demand can be 
defined in similar fashion. Excess demand for water is for example the volume 
of water that can be profitably used but which is in excess of the water 




excess demand buyer. Similarly the seller, who can supply at a lower price, 
will determine excess supply. The direction of trade will be from the lower 
priced person/business to the higher priced person/business as long as the 
price difference between the two regions is greater than the transport and 
transaction costs. 
 
The Upper-Berg River water allocation model consists of seven irrigation 
regions; Berg River one, two and three, Suid-Agter Paarl, Noord-Agter Paarl, 
Perdeberg and Riebeek-Kasteel. The irrigation regions are represented by 18 
typical farms, which were constructed with survey data. In the model the 
typical farms represents the excess supply and excess demand for irrigation 
water from each of the regions. The urban water demand sector is represented 
by a single demand function for industrial, household and other non-
agricultural use. There is no elasticity estimates available for the urban sector 
in the Cape Metropolis. An average figure from various studies (Hanke & De 
Mare, 1982) was assumed for the urban demand function. Although it will be 
more accurate to model the urban user sectors separately, this will increase 
model size and complexity substantially. The model makes provision for 
temporary as well as permanent water trade between all the user sectors. The 
Cape Town Water Undertaking (CMC) supplies more than 90 percent of all 
the urban water to the Cape Metropolis, Stellenbosch, Paarl and Wellington. 
All the present water supply sources are incorporated in the model. However, 
only the Theewaterskloof dam water is available for agriculture as well as 
urban water and therefore available for trade. Also included in the model are 
future possibilities for water augmentation schemes such as desalinating of 
seawater and recycling of sewerage water. The model calculates the value of 
water for water users who trades as well as those not trading. Water prices for 
the urban sectors are determined endogenously. Ecological and reserve 
demands are met through a fixed variable forced into the solution by a fixed 
ecological and reserve demand per month. 
 
The model is written in GAMS (General Algebraic Modelling System) and 
solved through the MINOS 5 solver. A solution to the model consists of the 
equilibrium supply and demand of water quantities for different water users 
and regions and transhipment quantities of water under various water trade 
scenarios. Thus, the model can reveal the value attached to water use rights by 
the different water users and irrigation regions, changing agricultural and 
urban water demand and supply under various scenarios and policy options. 
The model is complicated by the fact that it has to include the supply 
infrastructure and the demand sectors as close as possible. The model 
comprises around 7146 variables and 2936 equations. The objective function is 




agricultural sector. The urban water price includes the present purification 
cost and operation and maintenance cost for purified water. Due to the static 
nature of the model present value methods were used to accommodate long-
term crops. All prices in the model are for a discounted stream of cash inflows 
and outflows over a twenty-year period. Base prices are 1999 prices 
discounted with an interest rate of 13 percent (based on the median 
Commercial Bank 12 month fixed deposit rate of 10.75 percent plus a 2.25 
percent risk rate). 
 
4.  DATA USED 
 
Agricultural data was obtained through a farm survey conducted among 70 
farmers in the Upper-Berg River, from the database of the Deciduous Fruit 
Producers Trust and from the KWV.  Crop budgets were compiled with the 
Micro-Combud system developed by the Department of Agriculture: Western 
Cape. The urban data was obtained from various sources, including: Western 
Cape System Analysis reports (1989-1996) and the Cape Metropolitan Council 
Annual report of the City Engineer (1980-1999). There is no example of a 
relative free water market in South Africa and the transaction costs that will 
apply in such a market. It was assumed that for a high transaction cost 
scenario the transaction cost for permanent water trade would at least not be 
higher than the cost incurred during the old water law regime. In the Orange 
River where water transfers were common since the late 1980’s, the cost 
varied between R2000 and R6000 per farm of 30 ha with an allocation of 15000 
m3  per ha.  This cost did not provide for electricity and other irrigation 
infrastructure as well as brokers fees (Armitage, 1999). Although there is no 
similar published transaction cost figures available for the Berg River, the 
farm survey revealed that farmers payed about 6 cent per m3 of water for 
permanent water transfers. Informal temporary water transfers between 
farmers are common in the Berg River. According to the survey results there is 
no transaction costs as most of the transfers is “friendly” agreements between 
farmers. However, for the purpose of this paper a relative high permanent (6 
cent per m3) and temporary (3 cent per m3) transaction cost are assumed. The 
high transaction cost is then reduced with 50 percent in order to demonstrate 
the impact of lower transaction cost. The agricultural land and water use as 
calculated by the model are aggregated with aggregation factors in order to 
simulate the total agricultural resource use for the Upper-Berg River.  
 
Competition between the urban and agricultural sector is only applicable with 
regard to the Theewaterskloofdam as the other sources belongs to the CMC 
from which agriculture receives no allocation. Trade in this regard is therefore 




sector include the Table Mountain dams, Steenbras dam, Wemmershoek dam, 
Voëlvlei dam and the aquifers at Atlantis. The Palmiet River water transfer 
scheme only came into operation in March 2000 and will supplement the 
urban water supply with 31 million m3 of water per annum. 
 
5.  SCENARIOS 
 
The analysis comprises of three issues: 
 
•  A no trade versus trade scenario with present water use and with 
relaxed constraints on present water and land use. 
•  Water restriction scenarios under free trade conditions. 
•  Projected urban demand scenarios under free trade, free land use 
conditions. 
 
The different scenarios are contrasted principally to a base scenario. The 
following scenarios were investigated: 
 
A.  Trade versus no trade 
 
1)  Base scenario: present agricultural land and water use and present 
urban water use. 
 
2)  Free trade scenario: present agricultural land and water use and 
present urban water use. 
 
3)  Free trade scenario: relaxed restriction on agricultural land use (40 
percent deviation) and urban use. The total irrigation and dry land 
area available are increased with 10 percent for the upper reaches of 
the Berg River and 20 percent for the lower reaches. A relaxed urban 
demand but ensuring that at least 70 percent of the base urban 
demand is satisfied. Relative high transaction costs. 
 
4)  The same as scenario 3 but transaction costs are reduced with 50 
percent. 
 
B.  Water restrictions 
 
1)  Base scenario: same as A.4. 
 
2)  10 percent restriction on all water allocations. 




3)  20 percent restriction on all water allocations. 
 
4)  30 percent restriction on all water allocations. 
 
5)  40 percent restriction on all water allocations. 
 
C.  Increase in the urban water demand 
 
It was assumed that the urban demand for the Cape Metropolis (CM) would 
increase with 4 percent per annum over the next 20 years. The base water 
demand was therefore adapted with every scenario to incorporate this 
increase. It was also assumed that there is no restriction on land use and that 
farmers can adapt to the scarcity of water over the medium to long term. 
 
1)  Base scenario: same as A.4 but no restrictions on land use structures. 
 
2)  2005 projected urban demand: 20 percent increase from base. 
 
3)  2010 projected urban demand: 40 percent increase on base. 
 
4)  2015 projected urban demand: 60 percent increase on base. 
 
5)  2020 projected urban demand: 80 percent increase on base. 
 
It must be noted that the model only provides for a summer demand price 
(September to March) and a winter demand price (April to August). Further 
development of the model will also provide for a sliding scale price structure 
such as the one that is currently being constructed by the Cape Metropolitan 
Council (CMC). 
 
6.  RESULTS 
 
Due to the limitation on space no trans-shipment matrices for the water 
transfers between the irrigation regions (typical farms) are presented.  A 
complete report is available from the authors. The results shown in this paper 
only show the transfers between agriculture and urban use. The values 
calculated for water only shows the median, maximum and minimum values 
for each of the scenarios. The results are shown in Table 1. 
 





Table 1:  Simulated results of different water trade scenarios 
 
  Scenarios 
  Trade versus no trade  Water restriction scenarios  Urban demand scenarios 
   A.1 A.2 A.3 A.4 B.1 B.2 B.3 B.4 B.5 C.1 C.2 C.3 C.4 C.5 
Objective function(mill)  5387 5415 5596 5598 5598 5564 5530 5483 5343 5772 6803 8025 9369  10005 
Irrigated (ha x1000)                                           
Long term crops  14.65  14.65  14.70  14.48  14.48  14.48 14.48 13.57 12.26 15.44  15.44 12.71  9.63  8.87 
Short  term  crops  0.71 0.71 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.57 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.01 0.01 
Total irrigation ha  15.36  15.36  15.35  15.13  15.13  15.13 15.13 14.21 12.82 15.54  15.54 12.78  9.64  8.89 
Irrigation land value (Rand)  0.0  0.0  27.1  25.9  25.9  25.9  25.9  20.1  4.4  108.9  108.9 91.9  39.3  17.4 
Dryland ha  15.53  15.53  17.51  17.51  17.51  17.51 17.51 17.51 17.51 25.66  25.66 25.66 25.66 25.66 
Dryland value (Rand)  0.00  0.00  0.33  0.33  0.33  0.33  0.33  0.33  0.33  36.05  36.05 35.97 35.55 35.13 
Difference  in  value  0.0  0.0 26.8 25.6  25.6  25.5  25.5  19.8 4.1 72.8  72.8  56.0 3.7 -17.7 
Water use (Agriculture)-Mill m3                                           
Total  water  allocated  62 62 62 62 62 55 49 43 37 62 62 62 62 62 
Allocation  water  bought  42 55 55 55 55 50 44 39 37 55 55 55 62 62 
Dam  water  29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Permanent  trade  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tempory  trade  0.0 3.7 4.5 4.0 4.0 4.5 5.7 5.1 0.7 8.4 8.4 5.2 0.9 0.7 
Total m3  used per annum  70.8  70.2  71.2  70.0  70.0  70.5 71.7 66.7 54.6 77.0 77.0 61.8 41.7 38.2 
Water use (Urban)-Mill m3                                           
Total  allocation  -  Theewaters  183 183 183 183 183 165 146 128 110 183 183 183 183 183 
Allocation  bought  162 144  85  84  84 107 129 128 110  87  142 183 183 183 
Permanent  trade  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tempory  trade  0.0  17.9 17.7 18.3 18.3 12.8  7.3  6.2  12.3 15.8 15.8 27.8 50.1 53.4 
Other  dams  171 171 171 171 171 154 138 135 123 171 171 177 202 202 
Possible  sources  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  27 
Total  cubm  used-all  sources  333 333 274 274 274 274 274 270 245 274 329 388 435 466 




Table 1 (continued) 
 
  Scenarios 
  Trade versus no trade  Water restriction scenarios  Urban demand scenarios 
   A.1 A.2 A.3 A.4 B.1 B.2 B.3 B.4 B.5 C.1 C.2 C.3 C.4 C.5 
Average urban water price  16.3 16.3 19.9 19.9 19.9 19.9 19.9 20.2 21.7 19.9 19.9 20.2 21.3 21.7 
Values (Cent per m3)                                           
Present allocation                                           
Urban  1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 2.43 6.46 1.92 1.92 2.43 5.23 8.00 
Median  agricultural  value  0.00 1.37 1.37 1.47 1.47 1.47 1.47 1.98 6.01 1.47 1.47 1.98 4.78 7.55 
Maximum  value  0.45 1.37 1.40 1.49 1.49 1.49 1.49 2.00 6.04 1.50 1.50 2.01 4.81 7.58 
Minimum  value  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.68 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.45 5.22 
Value of trade water                                           
Urban  0  1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 2.43 6.46 1.92 1.92 2.43 5.23 8.00 
Median  agricultural  value  0  1.73 1.73 1.82 1.82 1.82 1.82 2.33 6.36 1.82 1.82 2.33 5.14 7.90 
Maximum  value  0  1.82 1.82 1.87 1.87 1.87 1.87 2.38 6.41 1.87 1.87 2.38 5.18 7.95 
Minimum  value  0  1.72 1.72 1.81 1.81 1.81 1.81 2.32 6.36 1.81 1.81 2.32 5.13 7.89 
Value of other sources                                           
Table  mountain  dams  1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 2.43 6.46 1.92 1.92 2.43 5.23 8.00 
Steenbras  dam  1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 2.43 6.46 1.92 1.92 2.43 5.23 8.00 
Wemmershoek  dam  1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 2.43 6.46 1.92 1.92 2.43 5.23 8.00 
Voelvlei  dam  1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.64 5.67 1.13 1.13 1.64 4.44 7.21 
Palmiet  transfer  scheme  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.80 5.57 
Atlantis  Aquifers  1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 2.43 6.46 1.92 1.92 2.43 5.23 8.00 




6.1  Trade versus no trade scenario 
 
It is clear from Table 1 that administrative allocation of water leads to incorrect 
valuation of the value of water. If free trade is allowed with no slack activity on 
the resource use, there is not much of a difference in the valuation of the water 
resource although some trade takes place. As soon as a water market is 
introduced and it is possible for the users to adopt other water use patterns, 
trade takes place to higher value uses and the value of water increases because 
users take the opportunity cost of the various uses into account when they use 
water. The median, presents the allocation value and it increases form zero in the 
base to R1.37 and R1.47 per m3 at the higher (A.3) and lower transaction cost 
(A.4) scenarios. The median value of transferable rights increase from R1.37 in 
scenario A.3 (high transaction costs) to R1.82 (low transaction costs). It is clear 
what the impact of transaction cost is. If transaction costs is high the advantages 
of trade is eroded away and therefore reduces the volume of water being traded. 
The total trade (urban plus agricultural trade) are reduced from 22.3 to 22.2 
million m3 of water if transaction costs increase with 50 percent. It is also clear 
that urban water consumption reduces with 59 million m3 (333 to 274 million m3) 
when the average urban water price increases from R16.3 to R19.9 per m3 (22 %) 
in reaction to the market signals. The analysis also clearly indicates that water 
trade shifts to some extent from between irrigation users in the high transaction 
cost scenario towards urban trade in the low transaction cost scenario. The urban 
sector values present water use rights at R1.92 per m3. 
 
6.2  Water restriction scenarios 
 
Scenario B.2 to B.5 clearly indicates how the value of water use rights adapt to 
the scarcity of the resource and how trade can solve some of the problems during 
decreasing water supplies.  As the restrictions increase, water is valued higher by 
all sectors. The total amount of irrigated land decreases from approximately 
15000 ha (B.1) to about 12800 ha (B.5) when only 40 percent of the allocated water 
is available. It is also clear that the productive value of irrigation land as 
indicated by the shadow price declines form about R25900 (B.1) to about R4 400 
(B.5). The reason why major adjustments in the agricultural sector only begin 
when the allocated water resource declines with 30 percent is that the urban 
sector only starts to use there full allocation from Theewaterskloofdam when 
water is restricted with 30 percent. The median agricultural value on the present 
agricultural allocation increases from R1.47 to R6.01 per m3 of water and the 




all users shows an initial increase when restrictions are implemented at a lower 
level. As the restrictions increase there is a scarcity in water available for trade 
and a rapid decrease takes place in scenario B.5 when only 40 percent of the 
allocated water is available. It is also clear that as the urban sector uses all 
available supplies, the last option is the desalination of seawater or recycling of 
sewage water. These options are however 4 to 10 times more expensive than 
other surface water sources and there is a more than 100 percent increase in the 
valuation of all the available water sources. It is however important to note that it 
will not be possible for the agricultural sector to make quick adjustments during 
water shortage years. These scenarios are therefore not realistic but attempts to 
illustrate the working of a water market. However, during years of shortage 
farmers will be able to trade water temporally to the urban sector and other 
higher valued users. Water markets will make a major contribution to alleviate 
the shortage in the sense that marginal or unproductive water users will release 
water to other users. 
 
6.3  Urban demand increase 
 
Scenario C.1 to C.5 shows the impact of projected increases in water demand for 
the Cape metropolis for 2005 to 2020. It was assumed that the irrigation sector 
could make major structural adjustments during this period. However, it is 
important to note that the present model does not account for the important 
multiplier effects of the agricultural sector. If the multiplier effects are 
incorporated costs might proof to be to high and a better option from a welfare 
point of view might then be to rather desalinate seawater or recycle sewage 
water. It is clear from the analysis that if multiplier effects are not taken into 
account there will be a substantial transfer of water from agricultural use to 
urban use when the opportunity cost for the agricultural sector becomes to high. 
This is especially evident during 2010 to 2020 when the total area under 
irrigation declines from about 15 500 ha in the base analysis to round about 12 
780 (C.3) and 8 890 (C.5). There is a rapid decline in the value of irrigation land 
and an increase in the value of dry land. Agricultural land use will shift to dry 
land use and the export earnings of the Western Cape will decline rapidly. This 
will lead to major social problems as unemployment will increase and secondary 
industries will start to experience the impact in the reduction in agricultural 
output. The average urban water price increases from a relative price of R19.9 to 
R21.7 per m3  (present value over a twenty year horizon).  
 




7.  CONCLUSION 
 
Although the model can still be improved with regard to the accommodation of 
various aspects, the model clearly indicates that water allocation through an 
efficient water market can make a major contribution to alleviate water 
shortages. The most important mechanism in a water market is that allocation of 
water is value driven. The user with the highest value (willing buyer) is enabled 
to buy water form users who attach a lower value to water (willing seller). Only 
temporary trade took place in the analysis of the scenarios. The reason for this is 
that the model is static and there is not enough information for the model to 
make a proper judgement between the differences of the two alternatives. 
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